http://venturebeat.com/2006/10/02/bold-start-up-powerset-about-to-raise-10m-to-take-on-google/
Powerset is a startup that is raising some eyebrows in
But people are wondering if search is already “good enough” and that Google/yahoo already fills the needs of the average user. Also Google’s stickiness is not just from its search engine, not the least because of the recognizable interface, simple main page, and robust ad-engine. AskJeeves already offers natural language search and yet it is a distant fourth behind Googs, Yahoo, and MSN. Powerset has a ways to go, but we won’t see just how good it is until they launch. This is interesting though because there is substantial interested from other VC’s such as Foundation. Search is still not entirely mature despite the strong businesses and business models that evolved from search portals.
Mayfield has a pretty substantial history and portfolio of enterprise orientated companies too including Legato, MIPS, Webmethods, Broadvision, and 3com. Since he left Mayfield, I wonder if that has any bearing on the direction Powerset may take, i.e.
Corruption and culture blamed
August 17, 2006
BANGKOK, Thailand -- It's a photo that has become a staple in the tabloids of southeast Asia: the foreigner taken in by police after being caught in bed with a local boy or girl.
For many of the region's countries that derive huge sums of money from the tourism trade, it's a vivid illustration of its seamiest side -- child sexual exploitation.
The spotlight was on Thailand on Wednesday after a man suspected in the slaying of 6-year-old beauty queen JonBenet Ramsey was arrested in a surprise breakthrough in a decade-old U.S. case that some feared would never be solved.
U.S. officials identified the suspect as John Mark Karr, a 42-year-old American.
In countries such as Thailand, child sexual exploitation builds on a long-standing and vast prostitution industry and thrives where law enforcement is weak or corrupt. That sex with young teens is not a strong taboo in some Asian cultures makes fighting the problem even more difficult.
In recent years, poverty-stricken Cambodia has become a new frontier for pedophiles for this reason. The arrests of aging British rock star Gary Glitter -- real name Paul Francis Gadd -- first in Cambodia and then in neighboring Vietnam brought a rare international spotlight, though new cases come to court virtually every month.
In June, Glitter's child molestation conviction and 3-year prison term were upheld by an appeals court in Vietnam. He had been found guilty of committing obscene acts with girls ages 10 and 11 at a rented villa in southern Vietnam.
"This case sends a strong message to child sex offenders around the world that society will not tolerate any form of sexual violence and exploitation of children," said Carmen Madrinan, executive director of the Bangkok-based child protection group ECPAT International.
Vietnam does not have the reputation of Cambodia as a haven for sex tourism, but recent surveys by the government and the United Nations Children's Fund indicate that child prostitution, including child sex tourism, is on the rise, Le Hong Loan, head of UNICEF Vietnam's child protection section, said this year.
"I think the case of Gary Glitter is a historic case for Vietnam so it can be more vigilant about the situation of sex tourism," Loan said.
In Cambodia, there are about 33,000 child sex workers, according to UNICEF.
The U.S. State Department has listed Cambodia as among the world's worst nations at adequately addressing human trafficking problems, including the trade of child sex workers.
Gartner has now officially anointed Web 2.0 a bona fide IT trend. BFD. Of course, they straddled the meme, by putting it at the peak of their 'hype cycle' graph. That is the consultant's version of plausible deniability. If it turns out to be real, they called it. If it is not, they still called it. This idea has picked up a lot of steam since I first noticed it
Before we all jump on this bandwagon, let's exercise some intellectual restraint and rigor, and in the process perhaps abandon the use of 2.0 as a synonym for "new". The original moniker of Web 2.0 has been used to imply/describe/justify/motivate a collection of concepts that range from standards (like RSS) to technical methodologies (like AJAX) to social phenomena (like personal publishing, rating, and sharing). Web 2.0 has been as much about sociology as technology. But Enterprises are not just big "collections of consumers" and so let's not graft the same concepts and expect a thousand enterprise flowers to bloom.
First, dispense with the sociology. Enterprises have two core attributes that do not exist as widely in the public web -- purpose and accountability. So 'empowerment' and 'collective intelligence' are not end points. Nor are 'discovery,' 'networking,' nor 'sharing.' These are embedded in processes and are methods for creating context to purposeful transactions. A sales forecast is 'collective intelligence.' Mining customer comments is a form of 'discovery.' A internal blog post is more likely to be linked to a product release status than photos of my vacation. Viewed in this context, a lot of what passes for (aspiring) businesses in Web 2.0 are simply features of larger processes in the Enterprise.
So Enterprise 2.0 as a platform shift is mostly about the enabling technologies. Web 2.0 rode the back of Open Source and Moore's Law to crack the economic barrier in building web based services. What followed were technologies for making applications richer (AJAX), easier to build (Ruby on Rails), and easier to integrate (REST and RSS).
But only a tiny community of developers have built Web 2.0 apps using AJAX, ROR, or LAMP. It is really just a few thousand people -- and very few work in large enterprises or ever will, again. So how will the Enterprise 2.0 apps get built? I doubt it is from a startup like Jotspot who has no business process expertise nor business data management expertise. I doubt it is Oracle or SAP who pride themselves on selling Sherman Tanks as radiation-hardened compact cars. The users will build Enterprise 2.0 apps, not the vendors.
The question is who will "get it" first?
- Will the enterprise application guys (the IT dinosaurs) "get it" about embedding communication and social context in long-running transactions, or
- Will the web 2.0 guys (the IT plankton) "get it" about business processes being the purpose of enterprise community and communication?
Tough call.
Maybe there's a third choice. Maybe the users will be able to imbue business processes with social computing features.
The growing consensus is that web-oriented architectures in the form of "mashups" will be the first wave of Web 2.0 in the enterprise. Maybe, but I think these are going to be niche tools, not mainstream. Why? Because today's mashups are data mashups and once you have the data, you rarely need it again. As a test, think about how often you got back to a cool mashup you've seen to re-use it over again.
This is the promise of process mashups - user-driven, maybe even user-authored, collaborative applications that support core business processes. Data mashups are the New EII. Process mashups are the new EAI. (To be meme-compliant you may want to call them EII 2.0 and EAI 2.0. I don't.)
We are ripe for an breakthrough as big as Visicalc. The spreadsheet exposed the power of the microprocessor to millions of PC users. It was and remains the only significant programming tool used by millions of people who know nothing of linting, compiling, scripting, or even looping. It provides a simple method of assembling data sources to create a custom "application". The application is really part of a business process, most often a financial process. A spreadsheet for business processes would be a powerful way to unlock collaboration and process knowledge in Enterprise 2.0.
Eric Biederman wants to have so-called namespaces in kernel. Namespaces are basically a building blocks of containers, for example, with user namespace we have an ability to have the same root user in different containers; network namespace gives an ability to have a separate network interface; process namespace is when you have an isolated set of processes. All the namespaces combined together creates a container. But, as Eric states, an ability to use not all but only selected namespaces gives endless possibilities to a user. IBM people want application containers, and for them the main purpose of such containers is live migration of those. The difference between app. container and the ?full? (system) container is a set of features: for example, an application container might lack /proc virtualization, devices, pseudo-terminals (needed to run ssh, for example) etc. So, an application container might be seen as a subset of a system container. OpenVZ wants system containers that resemble the real system as much as possible. In other words, we want to preserve existing kernel APIs as much as possible inside a container, so all of the existing Linux distributions and applictions should run fine inside a container without any modifications. Of course, the goal is not 100% achievable, for example we do not want the container to be able to set the system time. Linux-VServer wants just about the same as OpenVZ, it?s only that their implementations of various components are different, and their level of a container resembling a real system is a bit lower (for example, in networking).Read the whole article at source. Solution convergence is a huge problem here like in Xen / VMware server virtualization approaches. And an agreement seems too far at the moment.
A friend of mine has a hardware startup called PowerToad. Typical to any middle-aged startup, they are suffering from growing pains. It is imperative for startups to begin moving from the "sell it to anyone who sniffs at us" phase, to really focusing on just exactly, what type of market you are focusing on? Those questions are the most salient for PowerToad as they have signed up a number of high profile clients, but as of yet it doesn't appear they are cash flow positive and need just the right marketing and sales effort to make it all happen. This post from Early Stage VC seemed to fit the bill. Jeff if you're reading, take a look.
-------------------------------
Business Model, Schmizness Model
The term “business model” has bothered me for a long time. I have always found it to be a glib method of characterizing a company’s relationship with its various constituencies, e.g., customers, suppliers, competitors, etc. The problem isn’t really the concept. The problem is that it’s a complex, multidimensional structure that doesn’t really lend itself to a summary sentence, at least not if you really want to understand the business. Yet it one of those economic terms that has entered the popular lexicon as the rise of business schools in the 1970s and 1980s mainstreamed “businessperson” as a profession (like engineer, doctor, or lawyer).
Wikipedia does a decent job of summarizing the cacophony of ideas that are embodied in the term business model. I won’t recount them here. The reason the question “what’s your business model?” bothers me it that the inquirer often judges the answer based on its parsimony, as though simple is prima facie evidence of good. Occam’s razor applied to business strategy.
I myself will sometimes ask others the question, but I use it to test for complexity, not simplicity. I use it as a Rorschach to see how deeply the respondent has thought about the market and which aspects of the business appear most salient to him or her.
In preparing for this entry, I started to ask myself how do I think about a business model? And how do I test if business models are complete, coherent, and compelling? When I worked at Bain in the early 1980’s the firm then specialized in ‘strategy’ and ‘business definition,’ equally amorphous concepts. (Amorphous is good when you bill by the hour). We used to refer to three tests to define whether two companies were in the same business – similarities of cost structures, competitors, and customers.
So I sat down and drew this little graphic for myself to try and outline the key concepts that seem to appear in the “business models” of companies that I see in my practice. I don’t claim this is complete or some form of ‘ground truth.’ It is a snapshot of the concepts that I most readily gravitate toward when I think about “what’s your business model?” I am sure I have left out huge chunks that will become obvious when I go to my next deal pitch meeting tomorrow.
I am not going to explain every facet. Most of it is self-evident (I hope). However, a couple of things are worth noting. First, at the center are the terms “lever” and “return on equity.” I think of all these bubbles as knobs or levers in the machine that is a business. Not all are equally important, but all are impactful choices that Management has made about the business, even if the choice is to ignore this facet. Second, the objective I want to maximize is return on equity, not growth, not revenue, and not necessarily even market share, though these may be part of what generates ROE.
I have enumerated some of the common choices more for illustration than prescription. I should point out the category of “enterprise asset” because I think of this as a separate objective beyond barrier to entry. The “enterprise asset” is that intangible that is the difference between book value and enterprise value. It is the reason why an acquirer is drawn to the business beyond the NPV of the earnings stream. It is the strategic value or what accountants call goodwill. This box is particularly important in early stage investing, as the exits are so often around acquisition. The business should have a clear definition of its ‘residual value’ to a potential set of acquirers.
Hopefully some will find this useful as a checklist. There is nothing Web 2.0 about this framework. And there shouldn’t be. Business is applied microeconomics -- Web 2.0 or pest extermination (perhaps a poor juxtaposition – I need an editor.) Anyway I feel better for having shared my quick and dirty model of a business model. Thanks for listening.
So, quick, what's your business model, anyway?
Twenty Chinese companies, including four newcomers, rank among the 500 largest firms in the world in Fortune magazine's latest Global 500 list to be published on July 24. China's three largest state-owned construction firms made the list for the first time, with China Railway Engineering debuting at 441, China Railway Construction 485, and China State Construction 486. Shanghai Automotive, at 475, also made the list for the first time, but China First Automotive dropped from 448 last year to 470. Sinopec remains the largest Chinese company on the list, rising from 31 to 23, followed by State Grid, up from 40 to 32, and China National Petroleum, up from 46 to 39. China's four state-owned commercial banks also moved up the rankings: Industrial and Commercial Bank of China jumped from 299 to 199, Bank of China from 399 to 255, China Construction Bank from 315 to 277, and Agricultural Bank of China from 397 to 377.
Comparatively, India only has 6 companies in the Fortune 500: Reliance Industries Ltd, Indian Oil Corporation, Bharat Petroleum Corporation, Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd and Oil and Natural Gas Corp. State Bank of India just joined at 498th. The highest ranked is IOC, or Indian Oil Corporation. None of India, Inc. makes the 500. Heavy industry still puts companies in the Fortune 500 it appears.
Don't worry about DRM and lock-down computing, says Jim Griffin. Historically they're doomed to fail. The former director of Geffen's technology group believes that wireless networks such as 3G, 4G and WiFi will provide the tipping point at which the entertainment industries come to the table to cut a deal - before political pressure forces a deal upon them. The deal will involve one of the flat-fee models, such as 2002's Blur/Banff proposals [PDF, 473kb (http://www.nsu.newschool.edu/blur/blur02/reports/blur02_user_love.pdf)] or the model Harvard's Professor Fisher summarized here (http://www.theregister.co.uk/content/6/35260.html). Both of these envisage a pot of compensation money and a mechanism for divvying it up, permitting the free exchange of artistic goods. And with 'piracy' abolished, there's no need for DRM.
“DIRTY pop with wonky beats and sleazy melodies” is how the Sweet Chap, aka Mike Comber, a British musician from Brighton, describes his music. The Sweet Chap has no record deal yet, but he has been taken on by IE Music, a London music-management group that also represents megastar Robbie Williams. To get the Sweet Chap known, last year IE Music did a deal to put his songs on KaZaA, an internet file-sharing program. As a result, 70,000 people sampled the tracks and more than 500 paid for some of his music. IE Music's Ari Millar says that virally spreading music like this is the future.
It may indeed be, and nimble small record labels and artist-management firms will certainly get better results as they find ways to reach more people via the internet. But the question facing the music industry is when that future will arrive. And the issue is most urgent for the four big companies that dominate the production and distribution of music—Universal, Sony/BMG, Warner and EMI (see chart 1). So far they have been slow to embrace the internet, which has seemed to them not an opportunity but their nemesis. Rather than putting their product on file-sharing applications, they are prosecuting free-download users for theft. They have certainly been struggling: sales of recorded music shrank by a fifth between 1999 and 2003.
Today, there is more optimism. In the first half of this year, global physical unit sales of recorded music rose, albeit by a tiny amount. The industry claims that file-sharing has stabilised thanks to its lawsuits. The number of music files freely available online has fallen from about 1.1 billion in April 2003 to 800m this June, according to IFPI, a record-industry body. That said, internet piracy is rampant, and physical CD piracy continues to worsen.
But big music's attitude towards the internet has changed, too. Over the past four years the big companies have come a long way towards accepting that the internet and digital technology will define the industry's future. Thanks to Apple and its enormously popular iPod music players and iTunes download service, most music executives now believe that people will pay for legal online music. (Although they have mushroomed, legal online downloads account for less than 5% of industry revenues.) The big companies are trying to work out how they can harness the internet. Consequently, they are having to rethink their traditional business models.
In the physical world, the big companies have the advantage of scale. In addition to marketing clout, they own a large back catalogue of music that can be repeatedly reissued. They are also bolstered by music-publishing businesses, which collect royalties on already published songs used in recorded music, live performance, films and advertisements.
Historically, the majors have controlled physical distribution of CDs. Yet that barrier to entry will erode as more music is distributed on the internet and mobile phones. Artists can, in theory, use the internet to bypass record firms, though few have yet done this. The principal reason most have not is that they need marketing and promotion, which the majors also dominate, to reach a wide audience.
The majors have a tight hold on radio, for example, by far the most effective medium for promoting new acts. (Perhaps their lock is too strong: Eliot Spitzer, New York's attorney-general, is investigating whether the companies bribe radio stations to play their music.) Could the internet challenge them on this too? So far, bands have not been launched online. But that could change, and there is already evidence that data derived from the preferences shown on illegal file-sharing networks are being used to help launch acts.
Much will depend on whether the majors choose to address a problem that is just as important as piracy: these days they rarely develop new artists into long-lasting acts, relying instead on short-term hits promoted in mainstream media. That has turned off many potential buyers of new music. In future, using the internet, the industry will be able to appeal directly to customers, bypassing radio, television and big retailers, all of which tend to prefer promoting safe, formulaic acts. That could give the majors the confidence to back innovative, edgy music. But much smaller independent labels and artist-management firms can do the same, offering them a way to challenge the big firms head on.
Even in the physical world, the big firms are struggling to maintain their traditional market. Supermarkets have become important outlets, but the likes of Wal-Mart stock only a narrow range of CDs, choosing to shift shelf-space away from music in favour of higher-margin DVDs and videogames. That is a symptom of another headache for all music firms: they face ever more intense competition from other kinds of entertainment, especially among the young. In theory, then, digital technology offers the majors an escape hatch. With infinite space and virtually free distribution online, every track ever recorded can be instantly available to music fans. Of course, smaller firms will be able to do the same thing.
Where did all the music go?
According to an internal study done by one of the majors, between two-thirds and three-quarters of the drop in sales in America had nothing to do with internet piracy. No-one knows how much weight to assign to each of the other explanations: rising physical CD piracy, shrinking retail space, competition from other media, and the quality of the music itself. But creativity doubtless plays an important part.
Judging the overall quality of the music being sold by the four major record labels is, of course, subjective. But there are some objective measures. A successful touring career of live performances is one indication that a singer or band has lasting talent. Another is how many albums an artist puts out. Many recent singers have toured less and have often faded quickly from sight.
Music bosses agree that the majors have a creative problem. Alain Levy, chairman and chief executive of EMI Music, told Billboard magazine this year that too many recent acts have been one-hit wonders and that the industry is not developing durable artists. The days of watching a band develop slowly over time with live performances are over, says Tom Calderone, executive vice-president of music and talent for MTV, Viacom's music channel. Even Wall Street analysts are questioning quality. If CD sales have shrunk, one reason could be that people are less excited by the industry's product. A poll by Rolling Stone magazine found that fans, at least, believe that relatively few “great” albums have been produced recently (see chart 2).
Big firms have always relied on small, independent music firms for much of their research and development. Experimental indies signed Bob Marley, U2, Pink Floyd, Janet Jackson, Elvis Presley and many other hit acts. Major record labels such as CBS Records, to be sure, have signed huge bands. But Osman Eralp, an economist who advises IMPALA, a trade association for independent music companies in Europe, estimates that over 65% of the majors' sales of catalogue albums—music that is at least 18 months old—comes from artists originally signed by independents.
In the past, an important part of the majors'R&D strategy was to buy up the independent firms themselves. But after years of falling sales and cost-cutting, the majors have little appetite for acquisitions, and now rely more on their own efforts.
What Mr Levy calls music's “disease”—short-term acts—is not solely a matter of poor taste on the part of the big firms. Being on the stockmarket or part of another listed company makes it hard to wait patiently for the next Michael Jackson to be discovered or for a slow-burning act to reach its third or fourth breakthrough album. The majors also complain that the radio business is unwilling to play unusual new music for fear of annoying listeners and advertisers. And while TV loves shows like “Pop Idol” for drawing millions of viewers, such programmes also devalue music by showing that it can be manufactured. Technology has made it easy for music firms to pick people who look good and adjust the sound they make into something acceptable, though also ephemeral.
The majors could argue that they can happily carry on creating overnight hits; so long as they sell well today, why should it matter if they do not last? But most such music is aimed at teenagers, the very age group most likely to download without paying. And back-catalogue albums make a great deal of money. The boss of one major label estimates that, while catalogue accounts for half of revenues, it brings in three-quarters of his profits. If the industry stops building catalogue by relying too much on one-hit wonders, it is storing up a big problem for the future.
A new duet
There are signs that the majors are addressing the issue. Universal Music and Warner Music are starting up units to help independent labels with new artists, both promising initiatives that show that they are willing to experiment. Thanks to the majors' efforts in the last few years, their music has already improved, says Andy Taylor, executive chairman of Sanctuary Group, an independent, pointing to acts such as the Black Eyed Peas (Universal), Modest Mouse (Sony), Murphy Lee (Universal) and Joss Stone (EMI).
And yet even if they can shore up their position in recorded music, the big firms may find themselves sitting on the sidelines. For only their bit of the music business has been shrinking: live touring and sponsorship are big earners and are in fine shape. In the past 12 months, according to a manager who oversees the career of one of the world's foremost divas, his star earned roughly $20m from sponsorship, $15m from touring, $15m from films, $3m from merchandise and $9m from CD sales. Her contract means that her record label will share only in the $9m.
In 2002 Robbie Williams signed a new kind of deal with EMI in which he gave it a share of money from touring, sponsorship and DVD sales as well as from CDs, in return for big cash payments. Other record firms are trying to make similar deals with artists. That will be difficult, says John Rose, former head of strategy at EMI and currently a partner at the Boston Consulting Group in New York, because many artists, and their managers, see record companies less as creative and business partners than as firms out to profit from them.
Artists' managers will resist attempts to move in on other revenue streams. Peter Mensch, the New York-based manager of the Red Hot Chili Peppers, Shania Twain and Metallica, says “we will do everything and anything in our power to stop the majors from grabbing any share of non-recorded income from our bands.” Mr Mensch says that one way to fight back would be to start his own record company.
Independent labels are also gunning for the big firms. For one thing, they are fighting to stop further consolidation among the majors because that would make it even harder for the independents themselves to compete for shelf space and airplay. IMPALA will soon take the European Commission to court for allowing Sony and BMG to merge earlier this year. But the small firms are also optimistic that they can grow at the expense of their big rivals. The majors are cutting back in smaller markets and dropping artists who lack the potential to sell in lots of countries. That leaves a space for the indies. For example, Warner Music Group is thought to be readying itself for an initial public offering in 2005 and, as part of cutting costs in Belgium, it dropped artists this year. Among them was Novastar, whose manager says the group's latest album has so far sold 56,000 copies in Belgium and Holland.
The more the majors scale back, the more the market opens up. People who have left the big firms are starting up new ventures. Emmanuel de Buretel, previously a senior manager at EMI, is about to launch an independent record label called “Because”, with help from Lazard, an investment bank. Tim Renner, formerly chairman of Universal Music in Germany, will soon set up a music internet service, a radio station in Germany and possibly a new record label.
In the material world
Meanwhile, the majors are trying to plot their move to digital. Making the transition will be tricky. Bricks-and-mortar music retailers need to be kept happy despite the fact that they know that online music services threaten to make them obsolete. It is still unclear what a successful business model for selling music online will look like. People are buying many more single tracks than albums so far. If that persists, it should encourage albums of more consistent quality, since record companies stand to make more money when people spend $12 on a single artist than if they allocate $2 to each of six bands. Or it could mean that the concept of the album will fade.
Online pricing is unstable too. It is likely that download prices will vary in future far more than they do now. Apple forced the industry to accept a fixed fee per download of 99 cents, but the majors will push for variable, and probably higher, prices. Online prices will have an impact on prices in the physical world, which are already gradually falling in most markets. But the result of all these variables might be structurally lower profits.
Edgar Bronfman junior, chairman and chief executive officer of Warner Music Group, expects that paid-for digital-music services via the internet and mobile phones will start to have a measurable impact on music firms' bottom lines as soon as 2006. The new distribution system will connect music firms directly with customers for the first time. It will also shift the balance of power between the industry and giant retailers. Wal-Mart, for instance, currently sells one-fifth of retail CDs in America, but recorded music is only a tiny proportion of its total sales.
The best distribution of all will come when, as many expect, the iPod or some other music device becomes one with the mobile phone. Music fans can already hold their phones up to the sound from a radio, identify a song and later buy the CD. At $3.5 billion in annual sales, the mobile ringtone market has grown to one-tenth the size of the recorded music business.
But can paid-for services compete with free ones? The paying services need to put more catalogue online if they want to match the file-sharing networks with their massive music libraries. And it is still unclear how much “digital-rights management”—technology that restricts how a music download can be used—people will tolerate. Another key issue is interoperability: whether the various new devices for playing digital music will work with other online stores. Apple's iPods, for instance, work with iTunes, but not with Sony Connect or Microsoft's MSN Music Store. Too many restrictions on the paid-for services may entrench file-sharing.
Out of the more than 100 online music sites that exist now, a handful of big players may come to dominate, but there will be specialist providers too, says Ted Cohen, head of digital development and distribution at EMI. iTunes is like the corner store where you buy milk and ice cream, he says, but a customer does not spend much time there. Real Networks'Rhapsody, on the other hand, charges a monthly subscription in return for unlimited streaming music and gives descriptions that lead people to new artists. Recommendation services like these, as well as people sharing playlists, will eventually make the internet a powerful way to market music as well as to distribute it.
Jiving with the enemy
In September, according to comScore Media Metrix, 10m American internet users visited four paid online-music services. The same month another 20m visited file-sharing networks. The majors watch what is being downloaded on these networks, although they do not like to talk about it for fear of undermining their legal campaign.
Online music might truly take off if the majors were to make a truce with the file-sharing networks. The gulf between the two worlds has narrowed now that the industry sells its product online and allows customers to share music using digital-rights management. As for the file-sharing networks, “the other side is more willing to talk and less adversarial,” says an executive at one of the majors in Los Angeles.
Music industry executives say that Shawn Fanning, founder of Napster, the first file-sharing network, is working out how to attach prices to tracks downloaded from such services, with a new venture called “Snocap”. Mr Fanning tried to make the original Napster legal back in 2001, but the music industry decided instead to sue it out of existence. Sam Yagan, boss of eDonkey, currently the most popular file-sharing network, says he had meetings with three of the four major labels last summer about how his network could start selling their music alongside free content. As IE Music's experiment shows, that is not an impossible dream. Music executives may not have the confidence yet to make a deal with their arch-enemies. But eventually they have to get bolder. It seems clear that the only way for the majors to stay on top of the music industry into the next decade is to take more risks—both technological and creative—than they have done for a long time.
So the ability to manage a product's entire lifecycle is alot more simple if your turnaround isn't quite as frenetic as say a Dell's which has around 60 inventory turns a year.
After some further thinking, also, the reason Apple was able to dominate the personal MP3 player device is classic management consulting strategy. Although flash players existed before, they were among the first to market with hard drives, first to marketshare, first to mindshare. Then they built a platform in iTunes to bind it all. Coupled with fantastic industrial design, they were able to pull off a great win that has raised the tide for all of its products.
The same can be said when IBM introduced the modern mainframe in its S/360. Other mainframes existed before them like the Univacs used by the US government, but nothing before it was designed with such thoughtfulness to enterprise needs. For the next 20 years IBM rode its success until the client/server era changed all that up.
Apple is trying to do the same with the iPod, making it a hub, but the integrated model can only be successful a) if you live in the 1920's b) if you carve out dominant share in the marketplace. Even then, its pretty short lived the way tech evolves today.
http://online.wsj.com/public/article/SB114729881894749433.html For many years, there have been two models of how to make computers and other digital devices. One is the component model, championed by Microsoft. The other is the end-to-end model, championed by Apple. In the component model, many companies make hardware and software that run on a standard platform, creating inexpensive commodity devices that don't always work perfectly together, but get the job done. In the end-to-end model, one company designs both the hardware and software, which work smoothly together, but the products cost more and limit choice. In the first war between these models, the war for dominance of the personal-computer market, Microsoft's approach won decisively. Aided by efficient assemblers like Dell, and by corporate IT departments employed to integrate the components, Microsoft's component-based Windows platform crushed Apple's end-to-end Macintosh platform. But in the post-PC era we're in today, where the focus is on things like music players, game consoles and cellphones, the end-to-end model is the early winner. Tightly linking hardware, software and Web services propelled Apple to a huge success with its iPod. Microsoft, meanwhile, has struggled to make its component model work on these devices and, in a telling sign, is using the Apple end-to-end model itself in its Xbox game-console business. Now, Apple is working on other projects built on the same end-to-end model as the iPod: a media-playing cellphone and a home-media hub. The jury is still out on whether the end-to-end model will prevail in the long term. Many at Microsoft, and some outside analysts as well, believe the new devices will eventually succumb to the component model, and that Apple's success with the iPod will fade, just as its early dominance of the PC market did. Apple officials say history won't repeat itself if the company continues to make great products and avoid the business blunders committed by its past management. I think the end-to-end model can prevail this time, both for Apple and other companies. Consumers want choice and low prices. But they also crave the kind of simplicity and integration that the end-to-end model delivers best. Sure, you can get more variety in music players and in online music services if you opt for the Microsoft-based music instead of the iPod system. But the iPod, Apple's iTunes software, and the iTunes Music Store work so well together that users can just relax and enjoy the music. By contrast, the hodgepodge of players, software and online music stores on the Microsoft side frequently have trouble synchronizing between computers and players. Apple sells as many or more songs than the many stores that use Microsoft software. Critics attack the iPod and iTunes as "closed" and "proprietary," because the songs Apple sells at its iTunes Music Store play only on iPods, and iPods can't play songs purchased from other music stores. But both the iPod and iTunes handle the two most common open audio formats, MP3 and WAV, and the most common open video format, MP4. They work well even if you never buy a song from Apple. And iTunes and the iPod work on Windows computers, not just Macs. So how is that closed? Even the Mac isn't as closed as its critics charge. It's still designed to work with Apple's own operating system and software. But it can handle all the common files Windows uses, can network with Windows machines, and can use all of the common Windows printers, scanners, keyboards and mice. The Mac gives you the same access to the Internet as Windows. Heck, the newest Macs can even run Windows itself. You do get a choice of more software with Windows. And that's great for hard-core gamers and users of corporate, or niche, software. But for mainstream users doing typical tasks, the Windows choice advantage is illusory. Mac users can choose among thousands of third-party programs, including multiple Web browsers, word processors and email programs. They can run Mac versions of popular software like Microsoft Office and the Firefox browser. How much more choice do you need? Microsoft is hedging its bets. It has, in effect, created a little Apple inside Microsoft with the Xbox group. The Xbox team shunned Windows and wrote its own operating system and user interface, and built its own hardware. (The new Xbox was even developed using Macintosh computers.) Some Microsoft officials dismiss this anomaly by claiming that the game-console business is a special case. But now, Microsoft has assigned the Xbox team to create a portable music player it hopes can knock off the iPod. Why? Because the company is frustrated that the component model, which separates hardware and software, has failed in the music market. It's looking for more integration. Still, the end-to-end model isn't a lock. If Apple can't keep churning out cool products at reasonable prices, it could crash and burn. Unlike Microsoft, it doesn't have much help from other companies to succeed. But the iPod experience has shown that the PC model may not be best for all digital devices.
Great post from Ed Sim's from BeyondVC. Microsoft has a problem in that they are trying to build Google from the ground up within Microsoft with .NET and Microsoft's own stack of client server infrastructure. Byzantine? We'll find out and Microsoft will find out as well. Think of it as the ultimate experiment as to whether a billion dollar company can effectively scale out on Microsoft products. The acclaim piled upon Microsoft Server 2005 and SQL server 2005 will come to a full test. The problem is investors haven't bought into the idea and actually believe that the 2 billion dollars can be put to better use.
From a strategic point of view, this is money well spent. Google is on top of the world and has allied themselves with some angry characters including the forlorn former high flyer Sun Microsystems -- who has been bleeding talent including Vinod Khosla and Bill Joy to Kleiner Perkins. Scott McNealy leaving the helm to Jonathon Schwartz may be too little too late....
Still this is beside the point...in my assessment MS is making the right bet, despite investor sentiment.
-------------------
Can Microsoft reinvent itself?
Microsoft released its third quarter numbers the other day and while revenue growth was strong, the stock got hammered and dropped over 10%. Why? Microsoft plans on investing for the long term and putting another $2b into the Internet and other new technologies like the XBox. To sum it up, here is Rick Sherlund, Goldman Sachs' Software analyst, "It sounds like you're building a Google or building a Yahoo! inside the company."
Looking at the long term, I am quite excited about the prospects of all of this money coming into help grow the Internet sector and SaaS. First, having another big player push the concept of software as a service will only help further educate and soften the market, particularly business customers Secondly, this will mean that Microsoft will be aggressive with hiring and with acquisitions. I remember being at the Microsoft VC Summit a couple of years ago and hearing Steve Ballmer talk about his acquisition strategy. He would either do huge, billion dollar ones or look at acquisitions less than $20mm. That has been changing and will change rapidly with this renewed empahsis and focus. That only means good news for VCs and entrepreneurs. And as a VC, I wholeheartedly agree with Microsoft's CFO, Chris Lidell when he says, "Today, we believe we face the largest array of opportunities for growth and innovation the company has ever seen." I certainly feel the same way from a VC investment perspective.
Whether Microsoft succeeds or not is another story, but $2b invested in new technologies will go a long way towards solidifying their position. I would say that they did alright in 1995 when they decided to point their guns at Netscape to make sure the browser and Internet would not circumvent their monopoly on the desktop. The problem is that once they won the browser wars, Microsoft became satisfied, fat and happy. And as we all know, fat cats don't hunt. Others came around and outinnovated them - Firefox, Google, etc.
This is Round 2, which really started with Microsoft's purchase of Groove Networks and Ray Ozzie last year. To refresh your memory, I suggest reading Bill's email from October 2005 (also see the Ray Ozzie memo) where he leads the battle charge for the next generation web, the SaaS era.
Today, the opportunity is to utilize the Internet to make software far more powerful by incorporating a services model which will simplify the work that IT departments and developers have to do while providing new capabilities.....
However, to lead we need to do far more. The broad and rich foundation of the internet will unleash a "services wave" of applications and experiences available instantly over the internet to millions of users. Advertising has emerged as a powerful new means by which to directly and indirectly fund the creation and delivery of software and services along with subscriptions and license fees. Services designed to scale to tens or hundreds of millions will dramatically change the nature and cost of solutions deliverable to enterprises or small businesses.
And yes, it sounds alot like the memo Bill Gates wrote 10 years ago called the Internet Tidal Wave where he helped the big battleship called Microsoft reposition itself and point its guns at Netscape and others. Round 2 is no different from Round 1 but the stakes are higher and it will cost Microsoft oodles more cash this time to create a dent in this market. While we all know that memos often do not mean a whole lot, it is clear that Microsoft is quite serious as they are not afraid to piss off Wall Street and really put dollars to work for the long term position of the business. This will certainly be an interesting battle to watch over the next few years.
Also lifted from Don Dodge's blog:
Here is a list of the 22 acquisitions sorted by product group;
* VirtualEarth aka MapPoint - Vexcel and GeoTango do 3D imaging and remote sensing.
* MSN - DeepMetrix (web site stats), Massive (videogame advertising), Onfolio (web research), Teleo (VoIP), Media-Streams (VoIP), MotionBridge (mobile search), TSSX (China mobile services), SeaDragon (Large Image manipulation)
* Windows Live - FolderShare (file synch), MessageCast (MSN Alerts)
* Speech Server - Unveil Technologies (call center SW)
* Security - Alacris (Identity Mgmt), FutureSoft (Web filtering)
* Systems Management - AssetMetrix (License tracking)
* Business Intelligence - ProClarity (analysis and visualization)
* Microsoft Game Studios - Lionhead Studios (games developer)
* Exchange Server - FrontBridge (email security)
* Microsoft Project - UMT (Portfolio Mgmt)
* Storage Server - Stringbean Software (iSCSI SAN)
* Vista - Apptimum (Application transfer)
It appears that many of these acquisitions were focused on MSN properties and consumer based services. One thing to remember about Microsoft...the product groups run the company, and they all work largely independent of each other. They make the decisions about what to acquire and when. There are acquisition teams but they tend to be called in to execute the deal after the product groups have decided what they want to do. So, there will not necessarily be a high level strategy that all these acquisitions fit into, but they make sense on an individual basis.
Check 'em out on Myspace here.
I'm a little embarassed that the hottest IPOs and the most dynamic companies in the country's fledgling technology economy are based around games. For example read these paragraphs from MSN money:
"NetEase.com Inc., a Beijing-based online gaming and e-commerce company posted better-than-expected fourth-quarter results Thursday, prompting two analyst upgrades and a 14 percent gain in its shares on Friday."
"Another large online gaming company, Shanghai-based The9 Ltd., also posted better-than-expected fourth-quarter earnings on Wednesday, but the results failed to impress investors. Following an after-hours spike in the company's American depositary shares that evening, the stock has more or less leveled off and was recently up just 11 cents at $21.21 on the Nasdaq."
"Going with the pack, Baidu.com Inc., a large Chinese-language search engine, also posted fourth-quarter results above consensus targets. The Beijing-based company said Tuesday it earned 9 cents per share, 2 cents above average analyst estimates."
"Sina Corp., a Shanghai-based operator of Chinese-language Web portals, bucked the upward trend and posted a 21 percent drop in its fourth-quarter profit Wednesday, as revenue fell 9 percent. The results were a penny below consensus estimates, and the company's first-quarter outlook also fell short of expectations."
So two of the top companies are in gaming and are trading on the Nasdaq. The other cool tech companies are e-commerce and in search, respectively. On top of the stories of kids in Korea and China living generally unhealthy lives cooped up in internet cafes or in their bedrooms spending at least 16 hours a day playing these things, it leads me to believe Asians are succeptible to these things. What is it, the gambling gene? Is there a certain percentage of Asians that have a gene that makes World of Warcraft like crack to them? How about that kid that killed himself because his game character died or something like that?
I think in terms of character building, Asian cultures fail in many ways. Music, sports, and being social on real terms are just as essential as being successful or having stable careers in medicine, business, law, computers, etc. There definitely needs to be some changes in philosophy.
technorati tags: Gaming, China, Investments, Baidu, NetEase, Sina, Corp